AMUEL Johnson once remarked that nothing is so conducive to a good conscience as the suspicion that someone may be watching.
This observation reminds us of the purpose and underlying principle of campaign finance reform. In a perfect world, there would be no need to proscribe certain behavior in the setting of political campaigns, since individuals would not seek influence through their contributions, candidates would never be beholden to large donors, and the system itself would remain an open one. In the real world, campaign finance laws are necessary rules of behavior designed to protect the political process and promote certain basic democratic values. These laws and their enforcement help ensure that elections and government itself are free of abuses that would subvert democratic society.
The dynamics of the electoral system have such far-reaching ramifications for how we conduct ourselves as a democratic nation that we cannot view campaign finance in isolation from other facets of the democratic process. Our understanding of the nature of representation and participatory democracy, what we mean by consent of the governed, and our view of the legitimate function of government are integral to any discussion of what we want campaign finance reform to accomplish. The way in which we conduct our elections must then defer to these broader principles and values.
The role of money in elections is a troubling spectacle to this nation in 1986. The first stages of reform have given us a great wealth of information on campaign finances, but the statistics also warn that the problems of big money in the process persist. The potential for abuse lingers on because of unfinished business: the Congress's failure to provide for public financing of congressional campaigns.
The concept of public financing of elections in this country is not new. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt supported the concept in his state-ofthe-union message. In 1907, the Progressive Republican program was seen as the only way to get corrupt money and excessive money out of elections, and that is truer than ever 79 years later. Campaign finance data of the last 14 years and the current role of money in politics demonstrate conclusively that the American public would be better served by a system of publicly funded congressional elections than by any other single campaign finance reform now under consideration.
MONEY IN CAMPAIGNS
The sheer volume of money in the political process should be sufficient to prove the case for limiting its influence. Campaign finance experts estimate that campaign spending for all elective offices reached $1.2 billion in 1980. 13. Ibid., p. 400.
These concerns cannot be lightly dismissed. When we have reached the point at which an officeholder says, "Yes, I am troubled by what I have to do to raise campaign funds; yes, the process is time consuming and detracts from my ability to perform the duties of an elected representative; and yes, the public perception of the process may undermine confidence in the system," all of us should ask whether more remains to be done.
Fund-raising is as burdensome-in some respects, more so-for a challenger. It is a safe bet that many, many qualified men and women decide not to run for office solely because of the prospect of having to raise the enormous amounts of money the experts say are necessary to run a competitive race. Quite simply, the need to attract great financial resources has become a formidable barrier to those contemplating running for federal office. The price tag of campaigns, and the necessity of raising these huge amounts from private sources, should cause us to have grave doubts about how open the system remains. While the ability to attract vast sums of campaign contributions may be one means of testing a candidate's appeal, it should not be the only one, and certainly it should not be the single most important factor in determining a candidate's qualifications for higher office.
Compounding a challenger's fundraising problems is the increasingly common practice of incumbents' accumulating substantial campaign war chests far in advance of the next election.14 In part an understandable response to the 14. As of 31 Dec. 1982, nine Senate incumbents up for reelection in 1984 had raised over $100,000, and three of these had raised in excess of $600,000. 
The contributor's view
There is yet another perspective from which to view campaign fund-raisingthat of the contributor. On the positive side, those who contribute may feel they have a stake in the outcome of an election and so may be motivated to greater participation. Giving may also reinforce a sense of group ties or identity, since through association or pooling of resources individuals have a greater collective impact on the process. As they reflect the attitudes and the intensity of feeling of individuals toward a candidate, contributions may also provide some indication of how broadly based support for a candidate is. Knowledge of who his or her supporters are also probably leads to a greater appreciation by a candidate of what the supporters' needs are and promotes responsiveness in meeting those needs, if there are not other countervailing interests at stake.
We have seen in the evolution of campaign giving under the current law, however, an erosion of the positive character of contributions. Most noticeable is the diminution of the role of the individual small contributor. This reduction in importance occurred simply because the scale of campaign expenditures has come to dwarf the resources available to most individuals. In contrast to the individual giver, the highly organized and well-funded interest group has the means not only to survive but to thrive. It is this picture of campaign giving that should concern us. Under current law, multicandidate political committees, commonly known as political action committees (PACs), are allowed to contribute up to $5000 to a candidate per election. If campaign contributions carry their own political message, as we must acknowledge they do, the missing element in today's campaigns is the unarticulated view of those who are not well organized, who lack the financial resources and perhaps the motivation to be active participants in the process. If they are to be represented in government and their interests taken into account, their presence should be acknowledged at the stage at which the issues are framed and the agendas set for making future public policy-in campaigns for elective office. The current system of campaign finance has made it increasingly difficult to accomplish this goal. limit on the amount candidates may contribute to their own campaigns would eliminate the unfair advantage enjoyed by those with great personal wealth. And most important, public financing in congressional campaigns would restore a missing equilibrium between the sources of campaign funding and give officeholders a greater measure of freedom to address issues in the broad national interest. Such results would go a long way toward renewing public belief in the integrity of the electoral process.
Some will say that such further reforms will only lead to more creative means of circumventing the limits, that "special interest money has always found its way into the political system . . . [and] always will."29 All reform, however, is based on the notion that there are values at stake that make it worthwhile and, in some instances, imperative to control the potential for abuse in a system. That reforms at times have failed to achieve their stated goals, or that they have produced unintended and perhaps undesirable consequences, should not lead us to abandon efforts to safeguard the integrity of a process so vital to the preservation of democratic values.
Perhaps lead us to expect a growth, even a surge, in independent spending following enactment of public finance legislation. Witnesses in congressional hearings have been blunt in saying so.
An example cited is the publicly funded 1980 presidential general election, in which individuals' circumscribed ability to contribute to the presidential campaign gave impetus to the creation of political committees operating independently of the major candidates' committees. A similar phenomenon is projected for congressional campaigns, which, we are told, will become battlegrounds for a kind of independentexpenditure guerrilla warfare in which "Terry Dolan .. . and anyone else with the guts, the desire, and the lists... [can] become the future political kingmakers."30
Regulating independent expenditures
Even if independent expenditures increased dramatically, we do not have to accept as inevitable that they would wreak havoc on the political system. Instead, we should ask what means exist for regulating independent expenditures, if they become a problem.
The Supreme Court, in striking down limits on independent expenditures in Buckley, stated, "Independent advocacy ... does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions."3' Unfortunately, in a more recent case the Supreme Court again struck down limits on independent expenditures, holding unconstitutional a $1000 limit on independent spending by political committees in support of candidates in 
Public finance and political parties
The discussion of the consequences of public finance would be incomplete without asking what effect it would have on the political parties. In spite of early predictions, it is obvious that campaign finance regulation has not brought about the demise of the major parties. The Republican Party, in a way now being copied by the Democrats, has adapted remarkably well to both the law and the new technologies of campaigning. Within the constraints of contribution limits, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee have all been enormously successful fundraisers, able to assist Republican candidates up to the maximum allowable limits under current law. Although parity does not now exist between the two major parties in fund-raising ability, it will no doubt come to pass before the decade is out.
Public funding need not affect the contributions and coordinated spending efforts parties are currently able to make on behalf of candidates. Ways of further expanding the parties' role might well be explored, both in the context of publicly funded congressional races and through other legislative proposals to encourage party-building efforts. As significant as the monetary contributions of parties are, considerable advantages flow from an ongoing organizational structure and a steadily growing body of expertise on effective campaign techniques. Some, inopportunities for campaign management, public funding would introduce the concept of a level playing field in a large number of congressional races in which it would otherwise be absent-hardly a boon to incumbents.
There still may be the fear that public funding fails to take into account the obvious value of incumbency itself. Thus, in reality, challengers will be outspent in every race.
The official duties of members of Congress do encompass activities that can be factors in a member's reelection. Not the least of these is a member's voting record. The use of voting records in past campaigns suggests that this fact is not lost upon challengers or others. An incumbent's record alone may not cancel out the advantages of incumbency, but it should not be ignored when evaluating the fairness of a system of public finance.
The liabilities associated with incumbency do not justify an incumbent's using the resources of his or her office in patently political ways. Reforms undertaken by both houses of Congress in recent years reflect a concern that members of Congress not be perceived as using their position of public trust for political advantage.3 Ultimately, any system of public finance must take into 39. Rule 40, Standing Rules of the Senate, currently prohibits any senator from using the frank for mass mailings in the 60 days preceding an election in which he or she is a candidate (par. 1), precludes use of Senate computer facilities for storing lists that identify individuals by any partisan political designation (par. 5), and prohibits account concerns about the advantages of incumbency and, if necessary, must include provisions to compensate challengers for such advantages. That such adjustments may be needed should not overshadow the many positive attributes of a system of publicly funded congressional elections.
CONCLUSION
Public funding of congressional races is a workable solution to the problems that are most troubling in the current system of campaign finance. The role money plays in elections has made it increasingly difficult for the democratic process to function properly. If we continue on our present course, eventually we will reach the day when the amassing and spending of campaign money will have fatally undermined public confidence in the process and thwarted the democratic values the system is supposed to serve. The vast sums of money in contemporary campaigns already have had a corrosive effect on participatory democracy. If unchecked, the influence of money will continue to exaggerate and exacerbate an imbalance based on unequal financial resources and will further dispossess those who already have too little say in the decisions of government.
Congress 15 years ago set out to reform the role of money in politics. It is time it finished the job. use of Senate radio and television studies in the 60 days preceding an election in which the senator is a candidate (par. 6).
